How Mussolini had a leader of the opposition assassinated
The assassination of the socialist politician Matteotti in 1924. The Italian elections of 1924 gave a majority to a dictatorship. In hindsight, should Mussolini's party have been banned?
On June 10, 1924, Giacomo Matteotti, aged 39, left his home in northern Rome on foot on his way to the parliament library. He came there often: as a prominent member of parliament, he was known as a studious and thorough person. But he was also often stubborn and angry: among his fellow party members he was nicknamed Tempesta, thunderstorm. His family came from the Po Valley, in the countryside between Padua and Ferrara. Although his father had made his fortune in hardware and real estate, the Matteotti's had remained a red family.
A large black Lancia was parked on the banks of the Tiber, with five men in it.
Matteotti had published a book the year before: Un anno di dominazione fascista (1923), one year of fascist rule. In the book he had meticulously reported on fascist violence against opponents. The fascist movement was organised regionally, and each region had its own thugs. The trade union movement and allied socialists in particular were often victims of brutal intimidation and violence. According to the fascists, that was the only way to break the power of the socialists.
The socialists did indeed have power. Industrialisation in Italy had started late. Italy had decided in 1915, after much hesitation, to fight in the First World War, on the side of England and France. The main goal was the conquest of the Italian-speaking parts of the Habsburg empire: the provinces of Trentino and Trieste. Many a politician also thought of the war as a way to force more national unity. Italy was only formed a few decades ago; previously, the Italian-speaking area consisted of about ten small countries and a Papal State. Young Italy was organised according to the latest liberal ideas, with a system of districts, constitutional kingship, census suffrage and a huge House of Representatives in the capital, Rome. It became a catastrophe. With the exception of the region around Turin and Genoa, Italy had plunged into democracy from a pre-modern society. The church and the nobility were still firmly in control. The Italian tradition was regional, feudal, familial and clerical. Anyone who wanted to be elected as a parliamentarian in his region had to rustle his votes with backroom deals, patronage, hard cash and, if necessary, intimidation of the opponent. It would have repercussions on Roman politics: Italian democracy was born inert and corrupt.
Most Italians soon realised that no salvation could be expected from Rome. At the turn of the century, a ghost haunted Europe: the ghost of Marx and Lenin. The church, the landlords and the capitalists were pulling the strings. According to the red movement, that was the cause of the miserable state of the country. The means of production had to come into the hands of the proletariat, that was the solution. The syndicalism of the red unions gained a large following, especially in the more industrialised north. With mass demonstrations and strikes, the socialists were able to paralyse the industry. Without the consent of the trade unions, a manufacturer was left with nowhere to go. Syndicalism also had mafialike features: a manufacturer could buy off unrest with substantial donations. When Italy chose the armed attack on the Habsburg Empire in 1915, the war industry became crucial. That industry was largely in the power of the trade unions, which gave the socialists a key position in Rome.
What a number of ministers had hoped for had become reality: the war had in a sense forced unity, particularly in the armed forces. Conscripts learned that Italian cooperation could indeed be effective in a hierarchical organisation and with a common enemy. That realisation, and the networks of old comrades-in-arms, became an important source of fascism, which turned mainly against national paralysis. The socialists had become a major force in power. Conservatives, liberals and the powerful church found each other in their aversion to syndicalism. While the fascist movement was initially sympathetic to syndicalism, their aversion gradually grew. The socialists stood in the way of innovation and national unity, that was the consensus among the opponents.
Fascist support grew among the electorate. In the background, the Vatican and the king certainly did not stand in the way of the rise of fascism. Fearing that the army and police would side with the fascists in a coup d'état, the king did not dare confront the increasingly brutal fascists. Regionally, the fascist candidates engaged in the same tactics that had been commonplace among their opponents for decades. Intimidation of the opponents became a good fascist practice. Where violence and aggression against the socialists were concerned, they could count on the understanding of many. This is how the fascists' supporters grew like weeds. In 1922, their leader Mussolini was appointed prime minister in a coalition government. To force more national decisiveness, the electoral law had been changed: the alliance that won the elections could count on a two-thirds majority in parliament. In the 1924 elections, the alliance led by Mussolini received 66 percent of the vote, and thus an absolute majority. Even by Italian standards, the election campaign had been unprecedentedly brutal, with fascist intimidation across the country and a good number of political assassinations as well.
The socialists were defeated and did not keep muted. Matteotti had already published his book against fascist violence the year before, and after his re-election in 1924 he also made himself heard in parliament. He disputed the election results: “no Italian voter was free to decide as he saw fit.” After his speech, he told his fellow party members: "You’d better prepare for my wake."
Within a month, Matteotti was proved right. He was pulled into the black Lancia. Matteotti put up a fierce fight, but was no match for five men. He was stabbed to death. His body was not found until months later.
Whether Mussolini personally ordered this political assassination has not been proven. Most historians think that he at least knew about it beforehand. He might have wished Matteotti dead, in a tantrum. Matteotti was also doing research into corrupt dealings with an oil company; that must have hit a sore spot. But it makes no difference to the fascists' guilt: the assassination was part of a systematic fascist pattern, for which Mussolini knowingly and willingly bore ultimate responsibility.
The Italian elections of 1924 have gone down in history as one of the very rare occasions when democratic elections gave a majority to a dictatorship.
In hindsight, should Mussolini's party have been banned, and if so, why?
In this series, we will discuss the pros and cons of banning anti-democratic parties. Do anti-tolerant movements also deserve toleration? That is the underlying question, also known as the paradox of toleration:
Do we tolerate the intolerant?
This is the first episode in a series about political toleration. Here’s an overview of the articles in this series:
How Mussolini had a leader of the opposition assassinated
The assassination of the socialist politician Matteotti in 1924. The Italian elections of 1924 gave a majority to a dictatorship. In hindsight, should Mussolini's party have been banned?
What if the voter is fed up with democracy?
Is there a real danger that voters will want to abolish democracy? Or is it mainly a theoretical problem? The history of democracies that gave themselves up.
Should there be political toleration for intolerance?
Dead philosophers pondering the paradox of toleration. Is there room for anti-democrats in a democracy?
For these reasons, banning anti-democratic parties is a bad idea
In a democracy, the majority decides. If the majority wants someone else to decide from now on, so no longer the majority, then that is a great pity, but so be it.
These are good arguments for banning a political party
Non-violent parties should be banned that demand more room for themselves than for others, or who want to get rid of the system of overlapping consensus.
When should a political party get banned?
Let the voter decide. Except when free and fair periodic elections or unlimited opportunities for public discussion and unlimited provision of information are under threat.
How democracies can become tyrannical
Traits of intolerance in the democratic system. About discord and the common good, the tyranny of the majority, apathy, public choice and pathologic politicians.
Better alternatives for parliamentary democracy
Parliamentary democracy as the least intolerant system. Looking for a system with more legitimacy. About systemic criticism, Habermas' deliberative democracy, digital democracy, and sortition
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