How to lose your dignity
Out of human dignity, everyone can make their own sense. This is convenient when looking for universal human rights. About the conflicting meanings of human dignity, and why we aren't born with it.
The term human dignity often appears in constitutional texts. For example, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights begins with the following article:
All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.
In this and subsequent newsletters I reflect on that one sentence. Is it true that everyone is born free, and equal in dignity and rights?
In this newsletter we discuss dignity. Are we born with dignity?
Human dignity (dignitas humanae in Latin, or dignitas for short) turns out to be a difficult term to define. It is embraced by very diverse schools of thought: Christian, Islamic and Confucian thinkers, Kantian liberals, Marxists and jurists all use the same term, but all attach different meanings.
That the term dignity has been able to make it this far is presumably because it is a hybrid concept. Very different ethical theories can use it for their own purposes.
Can we still make head or tail of it? Arthur Schopenhauer certainly didn't think so:
This expression "human dignity," once it was uttered by Kant, became the shibboleth of all perplexed and empty-headed moralists. For behind that imposing formula they concealed their lack, not to say, of a real ethical basis, but of any basis at all which was possessed of an intelligible meaning; supposing cleverly enough that their readers would be so pleased to see themselves invested with such a "dignity" that they would be quite satisfied.
-Â Â Â Â Â Â Â Arthur Schopenhauer, Ãœber die Grundlage der Moral (1840)
The reality is that everyone uses dignitas for their own agenda. Let me give an example.
According to the Pope, the dignity of human life requires that we must not end it, even when life is hopeless and the dying process is suffering.
Proponents of euthanasia, a soft, self-chosen end to a desperate life, base their position equally on human dignity: a gruesome and painful end to life should be spared everyone. Such an end of life is not humane.
So: what is it?
Dignitas according to Cicero
Try to imagine traits of people who behave with a lot of dignity. You come close to honour and respect. Stately people. And now imagine traits of people who behave very unworthily. Then the image of someone who lies and cheats quickly comes to mind. Unsightly, foul and underhanded. We probably derived this sense of dignity from the Romans.
According to Cicero, and he was an expert, dignitas was a characteristic of the true Roman gentleman: a rational man, full of self-control, who behaves in accordance with his position and his task. Dignity was seen as part of a virtuous, honourable existence. Of course, it was appreciated if the other was also virtuous and dignified. But the morality of the Roman elite, as with the Stoa, was mainly focused on itself. The empire was, of course, teeming with paupers, non-citizens, barbarians, and slaves, but it would not occur to someone like Cicero to expect dignity from them, let alone to ascribe to them a right to a dignified existence.
The untouchable creation
While the Romans saw hardly any moral obligations to fellow human beings, purely because of their human nature, this began to shift in Christian doctrine. Among Christian thinkers like Tomasso d'Aquino, dignity is closely linked to the inviolability of the creation. Dignity is expressed as righteousness when you keep God's commandments and handle his creation with care. We are merely stewards and we are not allowed to control human life. Immoral behaviour is disrespectful and unworthy behaviour, because it goes against how God intended creation. The origin of human dignity lay in the doctrine that God created man in his own image. Anyone who does not show enough respect to another human being is essentially violating the holiness that God has given to everyone. People are unique in that they are ruled by divine providence, and therefore constitute a moral category in themselves. That unique human capacity for dignity comes back to Kant.
Dignity as moral autonomy
A remarkable conception of dignitas (or Würde, in German) comes from Immanuel Kant. We're going to see Kant more often. He intertwined human dignity with morality. Most things are exchangeable for something else: you buy shoes for money. After years of study, you get a diploma. "Everything has a price," says the cynic. But some things don't have a price, Kant argues. Those are things that are an end in themselves, with only an inner value.Â
Humans are naturally (at least a little) rational: we can adapt our behavior to the intended effects in the longer term. You hardly see that in animals.
So, we have options that we can weigh. Do we exchange a thing for something else? We weigh the effects on the longer term. A watch from an expensive brand has a price. But you buy that expensive brand for a reason. Because you like the aesthetics, for example, because you like to associate with the group of people who love that brand, or to show how rich you are. The higher values are then aesthetics, belonging, or prestige. You may want that prestige again for a reason. The further you abstract those values, the closer you get to the ultimate values. If you can't abstract any further, you've got them. When the ‘why’ or ‘what for’ question doesn’t make sense anymore.
But Kant wasn't so much interested in stuff; he was concerned with behaviour and morality.
Because we are rational, and we have options, we let the intended consequences determine our behaviour. Do you take the bike or do you take the car? Do you hit back or do you walk away? These questions have all kinds of dimensions. Health considerations, for example, or how you relate to risks.
But there is also a moral dimension: which option do you find morally better? You can also abstract these moral questions. You may feel that evil should be reciprocated, or that you should burden the atmosphere as little as possible. And those moral judgments, in turn, can be further abstracted: why do you think we should be careful with the atmosphere or that those who use violence should be punished? You can abstract those moral positions to the extreme, by asking why. Why should we be careful with the atmosphere? Eventually, when the ‘why’ question doesn’t make sense anymore, you end up with Kantian core morality.
Kant has formulated this core morality in a number of different ways. One of those formulations is that we humans must recognize each other's moral autonomy. Human dignity is the recognition that everyone, whether they do good or bad things, is capable of making moral choices.
Kant was looking for a moral theory that is — in advance — acceptable to everyone. This can only be achieved if we recognise everyone's equal ability to make moral choices. We should never assume that other people make inferior assessments, because then they may think the same of you. Anyone who considers other people's considerations inferior then has a moral legitimacy to oppress others. To see others as merely a means to realise one's own (morally superior) assessments. If that is morally permissible, the end is lost. We are morally obliged to regard everyone as ends in themselves, and never merely as a means to achieve our own goals. To do so would be to violate their dignity. People are goals in themselves.
Kant's moral theory is powerful. We can, of course, go on a wild-goose chase and criticise his theory. Although that’s very well possible, let's not do that for now. But we have to recognise that it's just a theory. That humans are (more or less rational) moral beings is undeniable. But the fact that we cannot treat people merely as a means does not automatically follow from this. We can only make that inference if we subscribe to a few underlying principles. That the moral theory that everyone can agree with in advance is also the best, for example. And that a moral theory based on mere rationality can stand. And that individuals should be the building blocks of morality, and not, for example, communities or traditions.
Kant's moral theory is not ingrained in us, we are not born with it. Kantian morality can be acquired as a habit, or by learning, but it can easily conflict with innate human moral qualities. For example, we are born with a biological urge for kin selection. For the survival of our genes, we mights easily cross Kantian boundaries, for example to protect our offspring. The right of the strongest is also a moral view, and one that is close to our innate moral qualities. But the right of the strongest is not compatible with Kant's morality.
However powerful, Kantian Würde is not innate but constructed.
A dignified existence
And then there is the meaning of human dignity that is most in vogue today, namely that every human being should have a dignified existence. That notion came about through a rather winding path. Aristoteles tried to describe how human flourishing can come about: through the development of virtue, in communion with others. The stoic Epiktetos argued that everything can be taken from a virtuous man, except his dignitas. The founders of the view that every human being has inalienable, innate rights, Grotius and Locke, did not explicitly base this view on dignitas, but gradually human rights have acquired that meaning.
Hannah Arendt described human dignity as the right to have rights. Arendt wisely recognised that people are not born with dignitas or with rights. But she did believe that all people in the world should be treated with dignity; in her view, that was a fallback option if states fail to protect their nationals. The experiences of World War II were still fresh, and the fate of the Jews had taught what can come of treating people as disenfranchised. But for Arendt, the attribution of dignitas to humanity was therefore of a political nature, not philosophical.
Antisemitism (and not merely the hatred of Jews), imperialism (not merely conquest), totalitarianism (not merely dictatorship) — one after the other, one more brutally than the other — have demonstrated that human dignity needs a new guarantee which can only be found in a new political principle, in a new law on earth, whose validity this time must comprehend the whole of humanity while its power must remain strictly limited, rooted in and controlled by newly defined territorial entities.
— Hannah Arendt, The origins of totalitarianism (1951)
As the Romans found, dignitas certainly also has a connection with social position. It's a lot easier to be a worthy human being if you can afford it. For those who have to scramble for a lump of bread, this is a lot more difficult: the value of dignity must compete with your need not to starve to death. This, of course, raised eyebrows among Marxists: shouldn't dignitas belong to everyone? With Karl Marx, human dignity played a diffuse role in the background, but a critical reading of his work shows that human dignity was indeed a deep motivator for his views. He opposed the system in which people are humiliated, enslaved, abandoned and despised. A class of people is humiliated ("entwürdigt"), used as a means (Kant!), and the result is that large groups of people cannot lead a dignified existence. In this sense, his program is unambiguous: by reversing that oppression, he wanted human dignity for everyone, at least for all proletarians. A dignified existence.
The most unequivocal advocate of a dignified existence for all is Martha Nussbaum. In an episode in the series of newsletters on equality, I will elaborate on her theory of capabilitarianism. Capabilitarianism is about human possibilities: the opportunities and possibilities that we have in order to function as a human being.
Why do we have a moral obligation to provide everyone with a dignified existence? Nussbaum has answered that question variously throughout her career. We must respect others. People need to be able to live their lives meaningfully. People must be treated on an equal footing. But above all, her argument for human dignity is based on Aristoteles, who described how people can flourish. And that argument, in turn, is related to his emotion, that the world can be so awe-inspiringly beautiful and wondrous when the world is in bloom, animals do their natural thing, and humans realise their potential. As compelling as Nussbaum may articulate her vision, it seems that she first had a conception of a dignified existence for all, and then had to look for arguments.
It's speculative, but it could be that Nussbaum's views on human dignity are rather unconsciously motivated by an emotion of empathy. I don't mean that flippantly. Our empathic module kicks in when we see a human (or an animal) suffering. Then we want to help. We cannot bear to see it. Her book Woman and human development (1999) begins with a description of the deep poverty she encountered in India. She then analysed how this came about, and what we can do about it, with human dignity as an overarching concept. Human dignity in this sense is — at the very least — realised when we don't see someone suffering, when our module of empathy doesn't play up.
Dignity as a grab bag
Jessica is a beautiful girl. She was born in a poor neighbourhood in Caracas, Venezuela. Her mother sells cigarettes on the street, her father has bolted. She hasn't had much education. She does have willpower. She managed to flee her country. Now she shares a room in Buenos Aires. Life is not easy. To keep her head above water, she stands in the Bosques de Palermo in the evening, scantily clad, waiting for customers. Jessica is a street prostitute.
If you ask Jessica how she feels about the human dignity of her existence, she answers pragmatically. Of course, she preferred to see herself in better conditions. But oh, she does it voluntarily, no one has forced her, and it's not that bad. In the same park, more women are working, and she had become good friends with some of them. Several customers are quite nice; She has a few regular customers with whom she even gets along well and who sometimes give her a little extra. And the pay is fair: she can even occasionally transfer some money to her relatives in Venezuela.
We also ask the question to a number of philosophers. In terms of dignitas, what about Jessica's life?
Cicero doesn't have to think long about it. Jessica is definitely not behaving with dignity. She's a whore!
Tomasso d'Aquino is also adamant. People must behave in accordance with God's plan. Sex for money is disrespectful and immoral. It's about the lowest thing you can do. Yuck!
We move on to Immanuel Kant. He doesn't really see a problem. Jessica does it voluntarily, she is an autonomous being who has her own moral considerations. She does not harm anyone. At most, Kant has reservations about her clients, who use her body merely as a means to satisfy their lesser desires.
Hannah Arendt then. She shrugs. She thinks it's sad for Jessica, but her dignity is not affected. She resides legally in Argentina, and if something goes wrong, she can go to the police. It is different for illegal immigrants: they are disenfranchised. Something needs to be done about this, Arendt thinks.
We ask Karl Marx. He immediately starts fuming about exploitation. He won’t blame Jessica for what she does. But it is outrageous that she is being forced into that position. Society needs to be completely overhauled to put an end to this kind of exploitation.
Finally, Martha Nussbaum finds it horrifying that Jessica has sunk so deep. Street prostitution is not a dignified existence. We have a social duty to help her and to prevent people from ending up in that situation.
In a later series on paternalism, we look at how human dignity sometimes forms a ground for intervention for your own good, namely if you do not behave with dignity.
Looking at all this, we have to conclude that Schopenhauer was somewhat right. The concept of human dignity is a grab bag, from which everyone gets something to their liking. No one will begrudge each other a dignified treatment, but in a philosophical sense it is certainly not a concept that offers guidance. We are born with all kinds of qualities, but dignity is not among them.
Further reading
Aristotle, Ethika nikomacheia (4th century BC)
Marcus Tullius Cicero, De re publica (54-51 BC)
Epiktetos, Diatribai (108 AD)
Immanuel Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten (1785)
Arthur Schopenhauer, Ãœber die Grundlage der Moral (1840)
Hannah Arendt, The origins of totalitarianism (1951)
Martha Nussbaum, Women and human development — the capabilities approach (1999)
Michael Rosen, Dignity: its history and meaning (2012)
Marcus Düwell et al. (eds.), The Cambridge handbook of human dignity (2014):
Rutger Claassen, Human dignity in the capability approach (2014)
Georg Lohmann, Human dignity and socialism (2014)
Christoph Menke, Dignity as the right to have rights: human dignity in Hannah Arendt (2014)
Ozy Brennan, On capabilitarianism, Thing on Things/Substack (2022)
More episodes
This is the third newsletter in a series about human rights and toleration. The series consists of the following episodes:
Was drawing up human rights really such a good idea?
Anyone who questions the existence of universal human rights can count on outrage. Yet that's exactly what I'm going to do here.Our universal human rights are dated and not universal
About the creation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Why large parts of the world can actually shrug their shoulders about human rights.How to lose your dignity
Out of human dignity, everyone can make their own sense. This is convenient when looking for universal human rights. About the conflicting meanings of human dignity, and why we aren't born with it.No, by nature, you have no rights to anything
Why we aren't born with rights. Rights as a social construction. About natural law versus natural rights. About innate moral modules and our ingrained sense of justice.Against human rights
Anyone who is sceptical about human rights does not make himself popular. But since the 17th century, criticism of human rights has not been soft. On criticism from Hobbes, Bentham, Marx, the communitarians and the Confucianists.Down with human rights!
The negative effects of universal human rights predominate. We have to get rid of them. There are alternatives. We can move from rights to duties. From a legal to a moral dialogue.
Zákynthos, 18 May, 2023
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