Better alternatives for parliamentary democracy
Parliamentary democracy as the least intolerant system. Looking for a system with more legitimacy. About systemic criticism, Habermas' deliberative democracy, digital democracy, and sortition
In this last newsletter in the series on political toleration we will conclude this topic. Political toleration is about attitudes and behaviour together. Citizens have political opinions, they propagate them, and they want to realise them (together with others) by doing something. Political toleration exists when dissenting political opinions and actions have their place within the system.
Resilient democracy
Particularly in a democracy, deviating political ideals can coexist. But that toleration is not unlimited. In the previous episodes we started with the limits, in the form of the paradox of toleration: how much room should democracy allow movements that want to abolish democracy itself?
Leaders who openly dislike the democratic rules of the game are elected on a regular basis. But never in the history of the world has a democratic majority given its vote to a leader who explicitly promised to abolish democracy. It was a close call sometimes, but even where democracy had degenerated into a hopeless mess, voters didn’t want to put themselves out of the game permanently.
This does not alter the fact that support for a 'strong man' regularly flares up. These days, even in a decent country like Belgium. Most autocratic regimes come to power through a coup. But even coups cannot succeed without at least some popular support. It would lead too far to go into detail, but the causes of democratic exasperation are diverse. Low social capital, high corruption, major class divisions, a messy transition to modernity, raging group conflicts, and economic setbacks seem to be common causes.
Violent movements that oppose democracy may be banned, there is no discussion about that. Borderline cases are more of a moral challenge. For instance, peaceful movements that adhere to the rules of the game, but that do want to change those rules.
It gets even more difficult when we encounter movements that do not want to establish autocracy, but that do want to challenge aspects of the democratic system. To determine whether a democracy should arm itself against those movements, we must know what the essence of a democracy actually is. An influential school of thought says that the essence of a democracy lies in its revocability. The electorate should always be able to change their minds. I have argued that this is not the most essential feature of a democracy. The essence of our democracy is the system of overlapping consensus, as formulated by John Rawls.
Overlapping consensus
What did Rawls mean by overlapping consensus? The question, according to him, was this. How do you ensure that policy is accepted as legitimate by everyone, even if the electorate is ideologically divided? The problem is that all moral doctrines are mutually exclusive: by definition, they cannot go along with each other forever. This does not only apply to religious, teleological doctrines. But Marxism, Hegelian idealism, Mill’s utilitarianism and Kantian perfectionism will not be able to do that either, Rawls thought. The only model that meets the requirements is a morally neutral, fairly procedural system that facilitates overlapping consensus.
A government that is seen as legitimate by all is possible only if political power is exercised in accordance with a constitution that guarantees that all citizens are as free as possible and treated equally. Furthermore, citizens must be able to assume that everyone will accept compliance with the basic rules of society because they subscribe to them without being dominated, manipulated or withheld information. Citizens must be able to trust that everyone, including the government, treats each other with fairness, and also without imposing each other's religion, ideology or moral system.
There is no alternative, Rawls argues. We want a society in which everyone should be able to find, say, be and do as much as possible in accordance with their own nature and insights. It follows that by definition we have a plural society. And in order to maintain and manage that plural society, we will have to work together. A collaboration that is also stable. Political toleration, democratic pluralism, is the only conceivable model in which this can take place, even if it excludes competing views:
Given the fact of pluralism, and given that justification begins from some consensus, no general and comprehensive doctrine can assume the role of a publicly acceptable basis of political justice.
— John Rawls, The idea of an overlapping consensus (1987)
Rawls saw that many countries are ruled on the basis of a balance of power: leading groups, each with their own system of interests and values, form a coalition in which power is shared. Often at the expense of other groups outside the coalition. Such a balance of power is by definition unstable, Rawls said. That is why he preferred a system of overlapping consensus, in which liberal principles such as equality and toleration are central. Some groups embrace liberalism as conforming to their ideas, others accept this liberalism as attractive because it doesn't get in the way of their own beliefs. This creates a system that is much more stable than the system of the balance of power.
Rawls admitted that this overlapping consensus is not suitable for every society. In some countries citizens have too little in common to reach an overlapping consensus, or there is a lack of mutual reasonableness and trust in each other. In other societies groups dominate that do not subscribe to core liberal values. But Rawls was not as pessimistic about human nature as Thomas Hobbes: human beings are capable of reasonableness, tolerance, and respect if they can assume that they themselves will be treated just as fairly, respectfully, and tolerantly.
Rawls thus defended the liberal-democratic constitutional state as we know it, consisting of:
periodic, free, secret elections;
democratic decision-making by majority vote;
an independent, impartial judiciary;
the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination
freedom of expression and political association
These are the principles of overlapping consensus. Democracy can defend itself against movements that want to undermine the system of overlapping consensus. This also applies to movements that demand privileges for themselves that they do not intend to grant to others.
Intolerant democracy
But we're not there yet. Because even if the rules of the game are followed properly, democratic systems can easily degenerate into intolerant societies. In the previous newsletter I explained how:
If the majority wants intolerance. Harsh punishment, for example. Or no sexual freedom. Or religious oppression, or ruthless ethnic policies. The causes usually lie elsewhere. Society may be burdened by persistent group conflicts, for example, or modernity has little influence on society. Democracy is then not a cause of intolerance, but it does not stand in the way of it either.
The voter is not well informed, but becomes apathetic and therefore sensitive to manipulation and populist arguments.
In a democracy, voters vote not for the common good, but for their own self-interest. Opinions also differ on what the common good actually is. The democratic struggle is therefore not so much a battle of ideals as a battle of interests.
Democracy fuels polarisation. The tone of the political debate is set by the extremes. Politicians thrive with fanatical constituents.
Decision-making by majorities carries the risk of minorities being left out.
Democracy attracts the wrong politicians: power-hungry and opportunistic politicians are good at gaining power. Hubris is an occupational disease, and sometimes pathological politicians also enter the stage. And even decent politicians are almost forced by the democratic rules of the game to play it cynical.
The voter only has the illusion of control
And those are just the problems associated with toleration. Parliamentary democracy comes with many more flaws.
Fundamental criticism came from the Frankfurt School of the philosophers Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, the fathers of critical theory, indebted to Hegel and Marx. In their book Dialektik der Aufklärung (Dialectics of the Enlightenment, 1947) they sketch the process of rationalisation and bureaucratisation in which we have been drifting since the Enlightenment. Communities erode, spirituality is ridiculed. We are increasingly wrapped in a web of bureaucratic discipline and an indomitable economic system focused on productivity. Businesses and governments manipulate us. Ideologies are the silos in the industrial process of democratic decision-making. Instead of moral progress, we achieve system efficiency, resulting in barbarism, violence and intolerance. Decisions that really matter are not made by voters, but by an alliance of powerful pressure groups, big corporations and unelected bureaucrats.
Horkheimer and Adorno were not wrong. It is therefore not surprising that political philosophers have started thinking about improvements to the democratic system. Important questions include:
How to transform a system where the discussion is no longer about a trade-off of private interests, but about how the public interest is best served?
How to ensure that the wishes and interests of structurally ignored minorities are also taken into account? This issue is all the more pressing in multicultural societies.
What can we do about the perverse role that politicians play in polarisation and demagoguery?
How can we reduce voter apathy, which makes us susceptible to populism, trivialisation and manipulation?
Many of these issues are actually related to scale. In a small community they are less likely to occur. Direct democracy works best in a small community, in which politicians no longer play a role. Exit toxic politicians. And if citizens are more directly involved in decision-making, they cannot so easily pass on the consequences of their choices to others. Apathy will therefore arise less quickly. Polarisation won’t thrive, because citizens have to keep getting along in their community. Although, of course, village feuds also exist. But in a community it is easier to compromise in the common interest.
The problem is that small communities cannot afford modern, professional governance. A village conducting its own monetary policy, or its own defence, that would be madness. No wonder, then, that political philosophers have begun to consider ways of introducing elements of community into the political system.
Deliberative democracy
A prominent line of thought is deliberative democracy. In that system, the emphasis should be less on conflicting interests and more on negotiation between citizens, based on the common interest. Some even dare to dream of consensus instead of compromise.
The most prominent proponent of deliberative democracy is the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas (b. 1929). Habermas stems from the tradition of the Frankfurter Schule of Horkheimer and Adorno. Habermas' political theory is expressed in his work Faktizität und Geltung (Between facts and norms, 1992). His analyses are not easy to read, but they are very thorough. Unlike Horkheimer and Adorno, he sees a way out of the bureaucratic and economic crush of the autonomous citizen.
According to Habermas, a society can only be stable in the long term if all citizens generally perceive it as legitimate: organised on the basis of truth, justice and the good. Governance is inevitably accompanied by coercion, just think of the tax system or criminal law. But as political decisions can count on more legitimacy, this coercion will be experienced as less oppressive and enforcement will become less of a problem. With more legitimacy, we experience governance by us, rather than over us. Before modernity hit, that legitimacy was commonly experienced in religious truths, but now that religion has become a private issue, science is taking its own path, and identity is individualised, a stable society must look for an alternative way to preserve legitimacy.
Whereas Rawls emphasised stability, Habermas says that stability comes from legitimacy. Overlapping consensus offers too little legitimacy, according to Habermas. Legitimacy is especially relevant when voters don't get their way. A major disadvantage of democratic decision-making is that the majority gets its way. And the minority does not.
As a minority you can have all kinds of reasons to accept majority decisions that you do not support:
That's how the system works: most votes count. At least, the system is legitimate and fair.
A minority’s prospect of being able to assert itself electorally. The majority won’t be in control forever. In the elections, a minority can try to gain power.
Aversion to opposing the decision of the majority by undemocratic means.
The realisation that even a majority is bound by constitutional restrictions to ensure that minorities do not get the short end of the stick.
The realisation that sooner or later the majority will also need the minority to make a decision on another issue.
But the best reason to accept a majority decision is a rational decision in the public interest. No one likes it when a power plant is built in their backyard. But the thing has to be built somewhere; it's in the public interest. If you acknowledge that your backyard is objectively the best place for a power plant, then maybe it's better to deal with it.
Habermas distinguishes two kinds of political circuits: the formal and the informal. The formal circuit is bound by rules: it concerns elections, political parties, decision-making and so on. The informal circuit is the social discussion that used to take place in coffee houses, on social gatherings, among members of political parties and in editorial meetings. Nowadays, that discussion takes place more at talk show tables and on social media. A political system can only function properly if the formal circuit is porous: formal decision-making is systematically influenced by the social debate, by what the people discuss among themselves.
But that's what is lacking. The voter does not identify with the decisions that are made democratically. We have already discussed the reasons. Habermas suggests introducing a deliberative democracy based on the principle of communicative action. He argues that there should be an open discussion amongst citizens, with the following characteristics:
Inclusiveness: all members of society should have equal opportunities to participate in political deliberations.
Rationality: Political decisions are based on reasoned arguments and evidence, rather than emotional or ideological appeals.
Publicity: Deliberations should be held in public, with all citizens having access to the same information and arguments.
Sincerity: Participants in political deliberations are committed to seeking truth and mutual understanding, rather than simply trying to win an argument or advance their own interests.
It doesn't get much more specific. Critics denounce Habermas' Teutonic illusion of rationality, calling his theory bookish daydreaming. There is also a snag. Habermas recognises that economic interests and power relations disrupt the process of deliberation. Powerful and wealthy groups will do anything to manipulate the discussion; they have the interests and resources to do so. Far-reaching redistribution of power, knowledge and prosperity is therefore required before citizens can deliberate on an equal footing. Beneath the naive idealism of Habermas' deliberative democracy shimmers a Marxist agenda.
Other alternatives
I wrote about the need to embed elements of small community decision-making into the democratic governance of modern nations.
An original idea is to no longer allow the parliament to choose, but to have the composition determined by sortition. All citizens with the right to vote can then be chosen by chance to have a seat in parliament. The idea is that the composition better reflects the population, and that political games might become a thing of the past. Ordinary citizens are not burdened by the coalition of interests that professional politicians owe their election to, and they don't have to worry about re-election. The chance of a more sincere exchange of ideas increases, as does the chance of consensus rather than majority decision-making. Elites and interest groups become less influential.
Sortition is a refreshing idea that certainly deserves consideration, but it also has some major drawbacks. The expertise of elected parliamentarians will be a lot lower. This makes them vulnerable to manipulation and blunders. Public administration will gain an enormous advantage in knowledge and experience, which will make the civil service even more invulnerable. And there are few incentives for the elected citizens to behave as exemplary representatives of the people. Members of parliament who neglect their duties or even misbehave may get away with impunity. The risk that parliamentarians could be susceptible to corruption or threats is substantial. It might get rough at times.
Another interesting idea is that of direct democracy. We all know referendums. In general, they are popular with voters, but less so with the political elites. Switzerland has a long tradition of referenda, about ten per year. It is constitutionally prescribed when referendums are to be held, and the system works pretty well. In other countries: less so. Politicians generally don't like them. Many policy issues do not lend themselves to simple yes-or-no questions. Referendums are susceptible to protest votes and fickle voters. They do not solve the problem of public interest versus private interest. Referendums are vulnerable to populist campaigns. The protection of vulnerable minorities is not necessarily in good hands with a plebiscite; it remains majority decision-making, and consensus is completely lost sight of. Polarisation is lurking.
But the legitimacy does improve somewhat. Citizens feel that they are an important factor. And the problem of protest votes and erratic voters does lessen somewhat when referendums are held consistently and regularly.
But referendums are still a hybrid system. When push comes to shove, professional politicians are still at the controls, with all its consequences. A radical idea is to bid the parliament farewell, and to have the entire electorate form a permanent people’s assembly, a digital democracy. Until recently this was unthinkable, but technologically the idea is now conceivable. It opens up interesting possibilities to speculate about. There is still little literature about it.
The democratic process roughly consists of election, debate, decision-making, implementation and control. Elections would no longer be necessary. The social debate has already been covered: this is already largely taking place in digital media. While social media may be sensitive to manipulation and polarisation, that would not change fundamentally with a digital democracy. Sure, it can get heated, but that seems inherent to the fact that everyone can participate, rather than a civilised debate between elitist gentlemen.
Digitising decision-making is the most difficult. Not to mention technical problems, such as voting secrecy and the risk of hacking. If every citizen can participate in the decision-making process, how to determine which proposals will be put to the vote? I think that it can be modelled though. The same goes for the problem of the tyranny of the majority. The Irish expert on direct democracy Roslyn Fuller has an idea: give everyone not one vote per subject, but ten. You can then divide those votes over several proposals. If you are very much against a certain proposal, for example because it affects you disproportionately, you can vote against that proposal with your full weight.
Admittedly, it all still sounds a bit immature, but that is also because it needs more discussion. Combinations of digital democracy, sortition and deliberative democracy are also conceivable.
Parliamentary democracy is in itself the least intolerant system we have. But the drawbacks are too great to ignore. Legitimacy and stability are limited, and there is no prospect of improvement. Is there a chance that we will ever overhaul our democracy? It seems unlikely. The vested interests are too great. Politicians are never going to decide to sideline themselves. We will probably be stuck with a faltering system for many years to come. Toxic politicians, the tyranny of the majority, polarisation, apathetic voters, the circus of interests, we will probably never get rid of them.
Further reading
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651)
Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Dialektik der Aufklärung (1947)
John Rawls, The idea of an overlapping consensus (1987)
John Rawls, Political liberalism (1993)
Jürgen Habermas, Faktizität und Geltung (1992)
James Bohman, William Rehg, Deliberative democracy: essays on reason and politics (1997)
Russell Dalton c.s., Public opinion and direct democracy, Journal of Democracy (2001)
Arthur Lupia, John Matsusaka, Direct democracy: new approaches to old questions, Annual Review of Political Science (2004)
James Gordon Finlayson, Habermas, A very short introduction (2005)
Jan van Dijk, Digital democracy: vision and reality, in: Ig Snellen c.s. (ed.), Public administration in the information age: revisited (2012)
Peter Mair, Ruling the void. The hollowing of western democracy (2013)
David Van Reybrouck, Against elections (2013)
Roslyn Fuller, Beasts and gods. How democracies changed its meaning and lost its purpose (2015)
Steven Levitsky, Daniel Ziblatt, How democracies die (2018)
Leonhard Hennen c.s. (ed.), European e-democracy in practice (2020)
Yves Sintomer, The government of chance. Sortition and democracy from Athens to the present (2023)
This is the last episode in a series about political toleration. Here’s an overview of the other articles in this series:
How Mussolini had a leader of the opposition assassinated
The assassination of the socialist politician Matteotti in 1924. The Italian elections of 1924 gave a majority to a dictatorship. In hindsight, should Mussolini's party have been banned?
What if the voter is fed up with democracy?
Is there a real danger that voters will want to abolish democracy? Or is it mainly a theoretical problem? The history of democracies that gave themselves up.
Should there be political toleration for intolerance?
Dead philosophers pondering the paradox of toleration. Is there room for anti-democrats in a democracy?
For these reasons, banning anti-democratic parties is a bad idea
In a democracy, the majority decides. If the majority wants someone else to decide from now on, so no longer the majority, then that is a great pity, but so be it.
These are good arguments for banning a political party
Non-violent parties should be banned that demand more room for themselves than for others, or who want to get rid of the system of overlapping consensus.
When should a political party get banned?
Let the voter decide. Except when free and fair periodic elections or unlimited opportunities for public discussion and unlimited provision of information are under threat.
How democracies can become tyrannical
Traits of intolerance in the democratic system. About discord and the common good, the tyranny of the majority, apathy, public choice and pathologic politicians.
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