When should a political party get banned?
Let the voter decide. Except when free and fair periodic elections or unlimited opportunities for public discussion and unlimited provision of information are under threat.
Earlier newsletters discussed arguments for and against the possibility of banning anti-democratic parties. Central to it was the paradox of toleration: whether opponents of toleration should be tolerated.
In this newsletter we briefly summarise the arguments against a party ban. After that, we will expand on the concept of overlapping consensus. In the previous newsletter I mentioned that as the only valid argument for banning anti-democratic parties. We then test the draft act for the idea of overlapping consensus.
This newsletter is also about the proposed Dutch political parties act. According to that act, a political party will be banned if it is anti-democratic.
But let’s start with a sad story.
The judge prohibits a paedophile association
Cody, then 19 years old, came to stay with Barbara, his mother. After dinner, Cody fell silent. Then he started hyperventilating.“I have to tell you something really bad,” he spat out with difficulty."I am a monster. If I tell you, you won't be able to love me anymore.” His mum froze. What could it be? She loved her son very much. She wanted to know, no matter how bad it was. Long silence.“I like boys”, said Cody, as Barbara held him.“I like boys younger than me. I am a paedophile.”
Linda Magazine covered what happened next with Barbara and Cody in February 2021. Unfortunately, it’s in Dutch, sorry about that.
Paedophilia, adults being physically attracted to minors or even children, is not a rare condition. Perhaps one or two percent of men suffer from it to a greater or lesser extent. It's a social taboo. When you can hardly talk to anyone about it, you will automatically contact kindred spirits, fellow sufferers, whatever you want to call it.
The Martijn Association was founded in 1982. Some members and board members were definitely not squeaky clean. Several had committed serious sexual crimes.
The statutory purpose was "Discussing and striving for legal and social acceptance of older-younger relationships."
There was nothing illegal on Martijn's website. But children were portrayed as beings with sexual desires, who in principle benefit from sexual intimacy with adults. The dangers of sexual contact with young children were downplayed. Martijn also published a calendar with photos of children, almost completely undressed.
Society must also accept views that are widely abhorred
The Court of Appeal found that the child's physical and sexual integrity must be protected. Martijn violated that principle. But according to the Court, there was no question of social disruption.
Society is resilient and is able to defend itself against unwanted expressions and behaviour that are reprehensible, but not punishable. Society should also accept views that are widely abhorred.
An appeal was lodged against that judgement with the Supreme Court. It ruled differently. The association was banned and disbanded for being contrary to public order, in the interest of protecting the health and rights and freedoms of children.
This is not about the question of whether the Vereniging Martijn was rightly banned. Associations have freedom of expression, but Martijn's information was very one-sided. Information may be one-sided, but the association's statements may have given paedophiles leave to cross boundaries in their love for children. Well, the novel Lolita (1955) by Vladimir Nabokov, might possibly have done the same. And other writings probably did so too, and aren’t illegal.
Judges are not always reticent
The issue here is how reticent judges are when they have to test constitutional freedoms against restrictive conditions. Freedom of association and freedom of opinion are enshrined in the constitution. Freedom of association may only be restricted by law in the interests of public order. This is allowed under European law when “necessary in a democratic legal order in the interests of, among other things, public safety, the prevention of criminal offences and the protection of the rights and freedoms of third parties.” Countries are allowed to use a broad interpretation.
The Supreme Court invoked a Treaty of Lanzarote that imposes on the countries “to make every effort to prevent all forms of sexual exploitation and sexual abuse of children and to protect children.”
So much for the judicial restraint in dealing with organisations that invoke constitutional protection. You have fundamental democratic rights, of course. Until what you strive for does not please the judge and he can grab a pious assignment from an international treaty.
This raises fears for the right to exist of controversial parties in our democratic system. Can the judge control itself against a party with nasty points of view? If large parts of the population detest that party for its views? If the party does not mince words, provokes, gives a shit about political correctness?
We will have to instruct the judge to restrain himself. The arguments for admitting controversial, even anti-democratic parties to the system are very strong.
Anti-democratic parties are allowed to have a place in a democracy
There are good arguments not to ban anti-democratic parties:
The democratic principle is: one man, one vote. Everyone can have their say and vote for whatever they want. Our freedoms are curtailed in countless ways, but at least we can judge our government in free elections for what it has delivered to us.
Democracy is democracy, with its own rules. Democracy means that the voters decide. Whoever plays the game according to those rules should not be disqualified on the basis of underlying values of freedom and equality.
Democracy cannot defend itself by giving up on itself. Toleration is a value-laden ideal, not a divine magic formula that fixes everything. Opponents of toleration can have quite good arguments. Toleration also commands toleration for opponents of toleration.
Their opponents have an abundance of democratic means at their disposal to combat anti-democratic parties. Combating anti-democrats must be done with arguments, not with a ban.
Violent parties should be banned anyway, regardless of whether they want to abolish democracy.
If you ban an anti-democratic party, you are actually giving their voters the finger: you’re telling them that they are not allowed to participate, their opinion doesn't matter.
The possibility of a party ban is like putting the fox in the henhouse. It enables powerful political movements to combat pesky opponents via the improper route of a party ban.
Most anti-democrats are not anti-democratic in principle, but signal that state democratic institutions have stalled, and are unable to pull themselves out of the swamp. Anyone who wants to ban anti-democratic parties closes their eyes to the underlying problem of which they themselves are often part of the cause, and loses sight of the dissatisfaction among the population.
Not all critics of democracy are intolerant. Some can come up with excellent ideas to innovate the democratic system. You should encourage those constructive critics; don't shut them up with a party ban.
Banning parties is far too harsh a remedy, while there are numerous constitutional remedies to make sweeping changes in state institutions very difficult. The procedure of a constitutional amendment is much more onerous than the simple majority required for the imposition of a party ban.
Never in history has a majority of voters consciously chosen a party that explicitly promised to abolish democracy. It was borderline at times, but still.
Weak arguments for a party ban
In a previous newsletter I have also identified the following arguments for a party ban as weak or inconclusive:
Proponents of a party ban believe that those who do not grant toleration to others, do not appeal to toleration for themselves.
That is a Kantian retaliatory argument that is considered harsh and outdated, nowadays.
Democracy is fragile, but it should not be abused. Democracy must be able to arm itself against its own demise.
That argument fails to address the essential question of what makes democracy so special that it is allowed to defend itself by undemocratic means.
If your (political) freedom is threatened, you must be able to defend yourself.
Sure, but democracy gives you plenty of room for that. A party ban is disproportionate in such a case. As if you, as a player during a football match, attack your opponent with a knife because of a tackle.
Karl Popper describes democracy as an open society, as the opposite of tyranny, and states that democracy must arm itself against tyranny.
But Popper's argument is more rhetorical than it offers a foothold for a manageable concept of democracy or for a ban on the Tyrants' Party.
Democracies are unique in their self-purification. Earlier decisions can be revoked under pressure from the voter. Autocracy has a much weaker feedback loop. And the decision to abolish democracy is irrevocable, while in a democracy every four years the voter has the opportunity to reconsider.
But an autocracy is never set up to allow everyone to patiently provide feedback. Autocracies are usually set up to clean up the rubble that democracy has left behind. And democracies also regularly make irrevocable decisions. And it may be true that you don't get rid of a dictatorship easily, but that also applies to democracies.
It is not about defending democracy per se, but about defending the values of the rule of law.
The binding of the government to the rules of the constitution and the independence of the judiciary are theoretically hardly controversial. At the same time, democracy and the rule of law are two different things: rule of law without democracy is quite conceivable. Moreover, the idea of the rule of law is not very well founded philosophically: it is mainly a practical solution to curb a proliferating executive power.
The underlying values of democracy include freedom and equality. It's about protecting those values.
But those values are neither universal nor natural law. There is a significant cultural component to it. Parties that question freedom and equality or want to mix it with other values can have good arguments for doing so. A ban for that reason alone would be a political decision, without strong philosophical justification.
Liberal democracy is better for the population: on average they are happier and more prosperous in a democracy.
That may be so, but that does not justify a ban. A ban would then be a paternalistic choice.
The abolition of democracy can be at the expense of a minority that wants to maintain democracy, and who has the most to lose from its abolition.
That is true, but that problem can also arise in democracies; you don't need a dictatorship to suppress a minority.
Pooh. What a list.
And yet, in very specific circumstances, I am in favour of banning parties. And I have only one argument for that: that of the overlapping consensus, from the book Political liberalism (1993) by the philosopher John Rawls. That should be a strong argument then. Whether that is the case, I leave to the reader. But I do think it is.
John Rawls’ blindfold
Every country has all kinds of mixed views, religions and ideologies. Everybody wants to see their own ideals realised. Except: the realisation of one social ideal often stands in the way of the realisation of others. Capitalism and communism are opposed to each other, just like theocracy and secularism.
Rawls thought of a system in which adherents of various social views could get along with each other. Because in addition to their ideology or world view, all movements also have another goal in mind: that things go well for the population as a whole. It should be possible to make decisions that can count on support, based on overlapping consensus.
In search of a fair system that everyone can agree with, Rawls often uses the metaphor of the veil of ignorance. Imagine, before entering the world, you do not yet know what position you will occupy in society. Are you poor or rich, pale or dark, smart or stupid, capitalist or communist, Islamist or atheist, you have no idea beforehand. Which political system would you choose?
Rawls is convinced that you would then opt in advance for a system of liberal democracy. In that system everyone has the freedom to profess and pursue their own worldview. The population will then periodically have the opportunity to express their preference on the basis of equality. The majority of the votes decide.
There is little to argue against that. I would opt for that system too. It is the best system that gives everyone freedom for their own beliefs, at the same time to run the country in the interest of the collective, and to allow different beliefs to compete peacefully and stably with each other. That's what overlapping consensus is about.
But Rawls struck out. In his book Political liberalism he advocated introducing his idea of justice as fairness as the guiding principle of a liberal democracy. He had developed that idea of justice as fairness in his 1971 book called A Theory of Justice. In that book he combines the idea of maximum equal liberty with a formula for redistribution of what he calls primary social goods: rights and liberties; powers and opportunities; income and wealth; and the social bases of self-respect. (In the series of newsletters about equality I'll go into that in more detail.)
If you all share my opinions, we'll come to an agreement easily
Rawls' idea of maximum equal liberty was not as controversial, but his ideas about redistribution were. Rawls was very aware of that: he had received strong criticism from all sides. And yet, twenty years later, in his book Political liberalism, he was still firmly attached to it. Not as a provocative opinion, but as a guiding principle for overlapping consensus. Groups wishing to participate in a liberal democracy had to do so on the basis of Rawls' conception of fair justice. Yes, I can do that too. If you all share my opinions, we'll agree easily.
Still, Rawls' idea of overlapping consensus is pretty strong. It is so strong that it can function as a criterion for a legal ban on political parties. A party that does not care about overlapping consensus is not playing the game fairly and should be disqualified.
We need to expand on that idea.
Overlapping consensus worked out
The idea of overlapping consensus may be a solution to the political variant of the paradox of toleration. That paradox is about whether toleration should also apply to opponents of tolerance. If we equate political toleration with overlapping consensus, then overlapping consensus might sometimes thrive on banning a political party. Namely, by excluding parties that want to get rid of overlapping consensus.
Under the system of overlapping consensus, groups disqualify themselves if:
they demand privileges which they do not grant to others;
they want to torpedo the system of overlapping consensus.
But, for several reasons, we have to be very cautious about banning parties. The broader the grounds for a ban, the greater the risk that:
the means of the party ban is abused to sideline political opponents;
bona fide democratic innovation is blocked;
movements are sidelined that do not cater to the overlapping consensus, but that have moral ideals other than (mere) freedom and equality;
critics of a dysfunctional democratic system and their supporters feel unheard and therefore further alienate from the political system.
Free elections and free expression
So we need to know under what minimum conditions a system of overlapping consensus can function. I'll make a start.
Free, fair and frequent elections in which the most votes count and where the government is bound by the result.
Unlimited opportunities for public discussion and unlimited provision of information.
Both assumptions could be stretched out a bit further, but you get where I'm going.
There are several types of conditions for a party ban that stretch the concept of overlapping consensus too much, with the associated risks mentioned above. To name a few: Promoting equality of opportunity and emancipation objectives. Privacy rights. Social and environmental objectives, including employment, social security, environment, public health, education.
I am not saying that these aren’t laudable ideals. They are in the Constitution for a reason, but they unnecessarily stretch the purely formal notion of overlapping consensus. Whoever makes weird proposals that harm public health, or who wants to introduce dragnet methods for all internet traffic, makes weird proposals. But that does not make the party anti-democratic. Let the voter decide.
The voter is not crazy
If you go beyond that very formal approach of overlapping consensus, you deprive the voter of his right to his own stupidity, the fundamental right in a democracy. Just assume the voter isn't crazy.
The political parties act
With this reasoning in mind, we now turn to the draft act. The key provision of the draft act on political parties states in article 86:
1. A political party shall be declared prohibited by the Supreme Court at the request of the Attorney General at the Supreme Court and dissolved if the party poses an actual and serious threat to one or more fundamental principles of the democratic constitutional state due to its objectives or activities.
2. The basic principles of the democratic constitutional state are in any case understood to mean:
a. periodic, free and secret elections;
b. democratic decision making;
c. fundamental rights;|
d. separation of powers;
e. independent and impartial judiciary.
Parties that pose a real and serious threat to the democratic rule of law can therefore be banned. Let's go through the most important elements of the prohibition one by one, and test it against the strict explanation I give to overlapping consensus.
Actual and serious threat
A ban only becomes realistic in the case of an actual and serious threat. According to the explanation to the draft act, it's not about parties that just say something or are too marginal to be taken seriously. It must be about parties that are already in parliament, or have a good chance of being there. In addition, there must be preparatory actions: concrete plans, for example in the form of a legislative proposal in preparation. I get that.
The explanation also says that you should not intervene too late: you must intervene before the party has a majority. I understand that too.
Elections
Periodic, free and secret elections speak for themselves. Whoever wants to abolish or undermine it clearly falls into the waters of the overlapping consensus. They are disqualified.
Jurisdiction
Independent and impartial judiciary has little to do with overlapping consensus. But, a dependent and partial judiciary mainly benefits the government, the executive.
A party that wants to come to power and that does not want the judge to get in its way can try to bend the independent judiciary. He then wants more privileges for himself, more room for manoeuvre than for others. This is contrary to the overlapping consensus. A political party that wants to get rid of the independent judiciary should be disqualified.
But things are more complicated with the other three mentioned elements of the democratic constitutional state.
Democratic decision-making
What is considered democratic decision making? According to the explanatory memorandum, this concerns decision making as guaranteed in chapters 5 and 7 of the Constitution. It contains a whole bunch of regulations. Everything passes. About the legislative process, the composition of the armed forces, the tax system, the money system, the orders of knighthoods, the municipalities, the water boards, a whole lot.
Does this mean that a party that wants to disrupt the budget cycle, or the orders of knighthood, or that wants to abolish the provinces, is threatening the fundamentals of the rule of law? So it should be banned? It appears so. Democratic decision making is termed as a fundamental principle of the democratic constitutional state.
The explanatory memorandum states that you may well pursue changes in the Constitution, provided that you do not undermine or want to abolish the democratic constitutional state or the democratic legal order. You should not touch the core of the Constitution: fundamental rights and the democratic constitutional state. And that core is then described in Article 86 of the Law on Political Parties. And with that the circle is complete. We keep going round in circles and we never find out what democratic decision-making actually is.
While it is quite easy to describe: binding decisions are taken by majority vote. That is characteristic of democratic decision-making, the rest is elaboration and makes the concept too broad.
Separation of powers
What applies to democratic decision-making applies even more to the separation of powers. The independent judiciary is already covered. The parties must stay away from that. We are left with a separation between the legislative and executive powers.
What else does the legislator want to declare taboo? Well, chapters 2 (government), 3 (States General) and 5 (legislation and administration) of the Constitution. Here, too, the legislator is going in circles. What is the separation of powers? What is in the Constitution. Can't you change it then? Yes, but you are not allowed to touch the democratic constitutional state. What is the democratic constitutional state? Separation of powers, among others.
The division between legislative and executive power is very diffuse. The government enacts legislation on its own authority. Both the government and the House of Representatives propose bills. And the parliamentary leaders of the governing parties are closely involved in government policy, behind closed doors.
Suppose a party wants to make changes to this, is the overlapping consensus then in danger? That seems unlikely. The same applies to excessive decentralisation and tackling the administrative patchwork. The party that wants to change that, deserves applause, not a ban.
Fundamental rights
Here again the same circle is made as with democratic decision-making and separation of powers. What are fundamental rights? The fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution and in all kinds of international treaties. Are you not allowed to change it? Yes, but you can't touch fundamental rights. Phew.
The question is: does a party that wants to tamper with fundamental rights undermine overlapping consensus? We need to take a good look at that.
In the system of overlapping consensus, everyone has equal political freedom to profess and pursue their own worldview, ideals, and interests. Which fundamental rights guarantee this?
In this context, I distinguish three types of fundamental rights:
Fundamental rights based on equal treatment and non-discrimination
Fundamental rights based on free speech and related
Others, which we mainly know as basic social rights, such as employment or education.
Equal treatment and discrimination
Article 1 of the Constitution states two things: equal cases are treated equally, and discrimination is not allowed. Those are two different things.
Equal treatment implies a prohibition of arbitrariness. The government acts on the basis of general rules that apply to everyone, without regard to persons. It also means that nepotism is not allowed: no cronyism. And it also means that you shouldn't disadvantage groups just because they are members of that group. This is especially true for characteristics that you are born with, or that you can hardly part with, such as religion or political beliefs.
The latter is elaborated in the prohibition of discrimination. This means that, among other things, racial, religious or political differences between people should not be treated as unequal cases. For example, the government may make a distinction between rich and poor people: poor people, for example, are entitled to a rent subsidy, while rich people are not. But the government may not decide that Hindus are not entitled to rent subsidies.
Both unequal treatment and discrimination quickly come into the water of overlapping consensus. If you allow nepotism, you give your friends political advantages that you do not grant to others. If you want the government to make a political distinction based on religion, race or political convictions, you strive for the political subordination (or advantage) of certain groups. Then you undermine the system of overlapping consensus.
But mind you, we're still talking about political overlapping consensus. Anyone who does not want to give Hindus rent allowance wants a regulation that is contrary to Article 1 of the Constitution. That's wrong anyway, but it shouldn't lead to a party ban. That will only change if you want to exclude people from the right to vote, for example, or deprive them of Dutch citizenship because they are Hindu.
Fortuyn, Wilders and article 1
Just before his murder, the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn pleaded for the abolition of Article 1 of the Constitution. He thought it was against freedom of expression. Fortuyn probably saw a contradiction that does not exist. It is true that, for example, you are not allowed to use racist language in public, but that prohibition is not based on Article 1 of the Constitution. It's in the Criminal Code, which is something else.
Pim Fortuyn just wanted to be able to speak his mind
A party that sows racial hatred is punishable, but it is not prohibited on the basis of overlapping consensus. However, that party risks dissolution by the court on the grounds that it is contrary to public order. I also have an opinion about that, but let's leave that out for a while, then it gets too complicated.
Should Fortuyn's party have been banned because he advocated the abolition of Article 1 of the Constitution? I do not think so. In the first place because he probably didn't get it right. It sounded like a blank, not a well thought-out plan, let alone a draft act. There was no clear and present danger. Secondly, he did not envisage any political disadvantage for certain groups. He just wanted to be able to say whatever he wanted without fear of criminal repercussions.
Things might be different with the Dutch politician Geert Wilders, who also proposed the abolition of Article 1. He had thought it through carefully: in 2006 it was even in his election program. This brought him very close to the criterion of an actual and serious threat. What did Wilders want to achieve?
The current article 1 (...) prevents the making of justified distinctions by throwing everything on the big heap of 'discrimination'. Unequal cases need not be treated equally. (...) As long as it is not clear that the Dutch Muslim community wholeheartedly accepts the order and rules of the Dutch constitutional state, the foundation of trust that is required to grant constitutional rights and freedoms to the same extent as to other groups in The Netherlands who have formed and carry this order and rules of the game.
- Dutch Freedom Party, Clear wine (2006)
With that, Wilders brushed close to the overlapping consensus. He said he wanted to prevent the construction of new mosques. He was not advocating that Muslims should not have political rights or less freedom of expression.
But at the same time he wanted to abolish the entire Article 1 of the Constitution, thus abolishing the prohibition of arbitrariness and discrimination in government policy. That could easily open the door to other discriminatory measures that could affect groups in their political possibilities. Abolition of Article 1 is in itself a violation of the overlapping consensus. Rival political movements must be able to trust that this consensus will not be broken. Abolishing Article 1 will violate that trust.
And a halt to the construction of mosques comes awfully close to a curtailment of religious freedom. Encroachment on religious freedom is in itself an encroachment on the tolerance of overlapping consensus, but rather on religious tolerance, not so much on political tolerance. On the other hand: religion and politics are often an extension of each other. And Islam is not only a spiritual movement, but also has elements of a political doctrine, as we will see later in the series on toleration in Islam.
Political freedom
Articles 3 to 9 of the Constitution contain the classic freedom rights. You must be able to say or listen to what you want, you must be able to meet without restrictions or to set up associations, there is freedom of religion, you must be able to express your ideas politically.
It is certain that the party that wants to blow up those rights undermines the overlapping consensus. A party that deprives others of the opportunity to freely say or believe what they want, wants for itself privileges that it does not grant to others. The party that wants to get rid of free speech and political freedom should be disqualified.
Fundamental social rights
Promoting sufficient employment is a concern of the government, as stated in Article 19 of the Constitution. It is a so-called fundamental social right.
What if there is a party that no longer wants to participate? Who says, for example: leave employment to the market; government interference is futile and often counterproductive. That strikes me as a reasonable position. Nor is it a crime to say such a thing. This actually applies to all fundamental social rights, such as equating public and private education (Article 23).
How would that party undermine overlapping consensus? I can't think of anything. It would be totally unfair to want to ban such a party.
Conclusion: remove the vagueness from the party ban
At the beginning of this newsletter I described how even the supreme court deals with vague standards. The party ban is a fundamental violation of democracy. The standards for a party ban must therefore be defined as strictly as possible. The current bill is bursting with vague standards and circular references. You should not want that. References to the democratic constitutional state, the separation of powers and democratic decision-making must be made concrete. Anyone who doesn’t care about fundamental social rights is by no means necessarily an anti-democrat. The bill places amendments to just about the entire Constitution in the danger zone. That is much too conservative and much too restrictive. It should be better.
My proposal
To conclude, I therefore just rewrote Article 86, I was at it anyway. I have marked the most important changes.
1. A political party is declared prohibited by the Supreme Court at the request of the Attorney General at the Supreme Court and dissolved if the party poses an actual and serious threat to political overlapping consensus.
2. Political overlapping consensus is understood as equal political freedom for all Dutch people in democratic decision making, namely the bindingness of:
a. periodic, free, secret elections;
b. democratic decision-making by majority vote;
c. independent, impartial judiciary;
d. the principle of equal treatment and non-discrimination which is included in Article 1 of the Constitution;
e. the fundamental rights as set out in the Articles 3 to 9 of the Constitution, as well as binding international treaties on the same subjects.
Conclusion
With that we close the topic. This series was about political toleration, and in particular about the prohibition of anti-democratic parties. It was about the paradox of toleration in the political arena. I came to the conclusion that Rawls' idea of overlapping consensus is the best solution to the political paradox of toleration. But interpreted restrictively: overlapping consensus only works if it is freed from normative restrictions as much as possible.
This is the sixth episode in a series about political toleration. Here’s an overview of the articles in this series:
How Mussolini had a leader of the opposition assassinated
The assassination of the socialist politician Matteotti in 1924. The Italian elections of 1924 gave a majority to a dictatorship. In hindsight, should Mussolini's party have been banned?
What if the voter is fed up with democracy?
Is there a real danger that voters will want to abolish democracy? Or is it mainly a theoretical problem? The history of democracies that gave themselves up.
Should there be political toleration for intolerance?
Dead philosophers pondering the paradox of toleration. Is there room for anti-democrats in a democracy?
For these reasons, banning anti-democratic parties is a bad idea
In a democracy, the majority decides. If the majority wants someone else to decide from now on, so no longer the majority, then that is a great pity, but so be it.
These are good arguments for banning a political party
Non-violent parties should be banned that demand more room for themselves than for others, or who want to get rid of the system of overlapping consensus.
When should a political party get banned?
Let the voter decide. Except when free and fair periodic elections or unlimited opportunities for public discussion and unlimited provision of information are under threat.
How democracies can become tyrannical
Traits of intolerance in the democratic system. About discord and the common good, the tyranny of the majority, apathy, public choice and pathologic politicians.
Better alternatives for parliamentary democracy
Parliamentary democracy as the least intolerant system. Looking for a system with more legitimacy. About systemic criticism, Habermas' deliberative democracy, digital democracy, and sortition.
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