Everyone should be able to say anything. That may not have been a right, but it was mostly a matter of course in classical Athens and Rome. We'll look into how that came about, and what one were and weren't allowed to say.
We also cover dialectic: in order to get closer to the truth, you need different angles. If they collide, it can lead to something beautiful, something better. Dialectic is a method. The writer places two opposing perspectives against each other, and tries to learn from them.
We need opposing views to move forward
But dialectics is also a social ideal. It is then not a writer who puts two opposing perspectives against each other. It is a thinker who believes that you need opposing views in society in order to move forward.
The latter in particular is a motive for toleration, which became very common in the 18th century. We look for the origin of that idea.
How it (maybe) started
In classical Athens from about 500 BCE you could say almost anything. Certainly in that era, freedom of expression was unparalleled. It's a long time ago; it isn’t easy to explain why it originated there. An authoritative theory is the following.
Greece around 800 BCE was not a country, but a cluster of larger and smaller city-states around (and sometimes in) the Aegean Sea. Between the cities there was trade, cultural exchange, rivalry and sometimes war. It resulted in a fairly successful Greek civilisation. The urban population grew, which lead to overcrowding.
What does one do in such a case? One starts colonies. Greece was actually a sea with towns around it, so they could sail. The most attractive option was the south coast of Italy: not too far, few troublesome natives around, and fertile terrain. Colonies arose that we now know as Syracuse in Sicily (Syrakosai), Naples (Neapolis) and Metaponto (now a dusty village in the sole of Italy, but then the important Greek settlement of Metapontion).
Archaeologists have found that those colonies were well planned: with straight streets, rectangular pieces of land. And very important: all plots of land were the same size.
The Greek cities were a class society. If you were rich, you had power; if you were poor, you had little say.
In the Greek colonies, everyone had an equal say
But in the colonies, the difference between rich and poor vanished: everybody was a fortune seeker; everyone owned the same amount of land. At meetings on the agora (the town square), everyone could contribute equally.
So far, the theory is well verifiable. What follows is a bit more speculative.
The Theogonia is a history of the world and the gods, in verse form, by Hesiodos. In that work, written about 700 BCE, the Greek colonies are favourably described. It is remarkable that - unlike in comparable works - not only gods and kings are presented in a speaking manner, but wisdom can also be attributed to 'the common man'.
Epic verses like those of Homeros and Hesiodos were generally not in writing. They were memorised and passed on for generations. Everyone knew those stories. There are indications that Hesiodos’ Theogonia planted a seed among the citizens of Athens and other city-states: ordinary citizens, too, apparently can speak sensibly and interfere in state affairs. Anyway: roughly two hundred years later this was put into practice. Ordinary citizens were given political say on an equal footing, just as in the colonies.
The back of the tongue
In classical Athens from about 500 BCE you could say a lot. Certainly for that time, the freedom of speech was unparalleled.
This freedom applied primarily to political speeches and public speeches. Isegoria applied for all free Athenians: they had equal freedom of expression in political gatherings. Everyone was allowed to speak, and in principle was allowed to advocate any point of view. Everyone assumed that the aristocracy was allowed to do that. But the fact that perfectly normal citizens could equally express their opinions, they also thought that was special.
For the Athenians, the isegoria of the debate was perhaps even more important than the principle of one man, one vote. Those votes had often been bought anyway, but at least the truth had been told.
There were limits to what you could say, though. You were not allowed to slander someone publicly. You were fined five hundred drachma if you lied that someone in a battle had thrown away his shield, or that he had struck his father or mother. Accusing people of corruption was also not done, although corruption in politics was probably the rule rather than the exception. The same was true if you called someone a whoremonger (or a whore, for all I care).
Isegoria and parrhesia: saying what you think was a virtue
The Greeks were also familiar with the term parrhesia, which meant something like showing the back of your tongue. Parrhesia was a requirement for public speeches and meetings. With the rise of the Hellenic monarchies, parrhesia also became the norm in the relationship between the sovereign and his advisors. An advisor to the king was supposed to help with his decisions and prevent him from abusing his power. The consultant was obliged to apply parrhesia.
Not that parrhesia was risk-free. You could also go too far. If spoke too rudely to the wrong person, you actually ran the risk of a beating or worse. Nonetheless, taking that risk was enouraged. Parrhesia was a mischievous virtue.
Philosophers who were too bold also had a particularly bad reputation. Irreverent remarks about the gods were especially seen as undermining. Several philosophers were banished from the city, and in 306 BCE there was even a general ban on philosophical teaching in the city.
The playwright Aristofanes offended everything and everyone, which earned him a lot of fame. King Alexander the Great, the most powerful man in the world at the time, visited the thinker Diogenes, whom he admired, once again lazing in the sun.
“Can I do you a favour?” Alexander asked the sage.
"Certainly. Step aside for a moment, you are standing in my sunlight.”
Alexander could laugh about it. “If I were not King Alexander, I would like to be Diogenes.”
His answer: “If I were not Diogenes, I would like to be Diogenes too.”
Sokrates and the dialectic
One of the most famous parrhesiasts was Sokrates, we already read about him in the previous episode in this series, about epistemology and scepticism. Sokrates was typically a philosopher who rarely minced words.
In the Sokratic dialogues, Plato lets Sokrates apply an ingenious method to approach the truth: the sokratic method.
Sokrates asks a difficult question. For example: “what is justice?”. That is an attempt to contact the eidos (form) of the just. His interlocutor then comes up with a certain definition. Sokrates first goes along with his argument, and lets him elaborate his definition: that’s called Sokratic irony (eironeia). He then gives counterarguments, after which the interlocutor must admit that his definition is not tenable and that he does not know what a correct definition is: that is elenchos: "putting it to the test".
Dialectics, according to Sokrates, is a linear process between a proposition and counterarguments, aimed at giving birth to more insight
Once his interlocutor realises through discussion with Sokrates that he actually knows nothing, then the real work can begin. Sokrates will now try, by asking the right questions, to reveal what he can know about the subject. He only asks questions; does not provide answers: the answers come from his interlocutor himself. He is here searching his own soul with his mind, for his knowledge (episteme) about the shapes. This knowledge does not come from Sokrates, but from himself, through anamnese, bringing up something you actually already know. Sokrates only helps in the emergence of this knowledge: that’s called maieutics, the "art of the midwives," because it helps, as it were, to "give birth" to knowledge. Unfortunately, maieutics rarely ever leads to contact with the forms: the dialogue usually ends in Plato's ignorance (aporia). But in any case the soul is now better prepared to behold the forms.
This Sokratic method is one of the archetypes of dialectics. Dialectics is an exchange of thoughts between two or more people. They have different views on a subject, but together they want to seek the truth through reasoned arguments. It shows the characteristics of a discussion, but without subjective elements such as emotional appeal or what we now understand as rhetoric. The interlocutors must want to seek the truth in good faith; there is no question of winning or losing. The method as a form is opposed to the didactics, where one teaches the other and so there is no dialogue.
Ironically, Sokrates himself was the most famous exception to the principle of free speech in Athens. The authorities of Athens ultimately found his views too subversive. He was accused of a pernicious influence on youth. Sokrates was forced to commit suicide.
Freedom of expression in classical Rome
The Roman dictator Iulius Caesar was murdered in the senate, in 44 BCE. His popularity was waning, but his behaviour had become more and more cocky. The most famous co-perpetrator of the murder was Caesar's ally Brutus. The assassination of Caesar would continue to occupy Rome for a long time to come.
The historian Aulus Cremutius Cordus wrote in the era of Emperor Tiberius, say, sixty years later. In his work, he wrote favourably of Brutus and his co-conspirators. To Tiberius, that hit a nerve. Tiberius’ popularity was waning around 23 AD.
Cordus was accused of treason, a crime that was actually meant for espionage for the enemy and all that. There were no criminal provisions for insult and incitement, so it had to be treason. Whoever insults the emperor was apparently conspiring with the enemy. Cordus was allowed to plead his case in the senate:
The poems which we read of Bibaculus and Catullus are crammed with invectives on the Caesars. Yet the Divine Iulius, the Divine Augustus themselves bore all this and let it pass, whether in forbearance or in wisdom I cannot easily say. Assuredly what is despised is soon forgotten; when you resent a thing, you seem to recognise it.
Of the Greeks I say nothing; with them not only liberty, but even licence went unpunished, or if a person aimed at chastising, he retaliated on satire by satire. It has, however, always been perfectly open to us without any one to censure, to speak freely of those whom death has withdrawn alike from the partialities of hatred or esteem.
Aulus Cremutius Cordus, quoted in Tacitus, Annales (IV, 34-35)
Cordus' defence contained - in addition to an appeal to legal equality and a passage (which I didn’t include) in which he states that the harm was minor and the intention good - at least three more arguments:
Respond with patience to what you do not like. I categorise that defence as an appeal to humanitas: you shouldn't be so hard on fallible humans. A subsequent newsletter in this series will be dedicated to humanitas as a motive for toleration.
Don't pay attention to it, because then you will only make it bigger. That argument is first and foremost pragmatic of nature. But it is also an argument that you encounter a lot in the teachings of the stoics. Two separate newsletters will also follow in this series about both motives.
The reference to the toleration of the Greeks seems more like a principled plea for freedom of expression.
Cordus’ pleading did not help him. He was ordered to commit suicide, and his writings were burned.
Roman citizens were allowed to say just about anything in public
Cordus' fate is known as an exceptional curtailment of free speech in the Roman Empire. Roman citizens were generally allowed to say anything. Even sedition or slander was rarely prosecuted. All Roman citizens had the right to vote for the city council. Politicians regularly held political meetings that were often turbulent. The audience could shout and rant for pleasure, and shout the most slanderous things against the speakers. It wouldn’t but rattle the floor.
You have to remember that the printing press did not exist yet. Large-scale dissemination of incendiary ideas was therefore only possible to a limited extent. But even stage performances, as a rule, were not censored. The custom of letting the people say whatever they wanted was taken for granted. I have not encountered any pleas to introduce censorship or laws against defamation.
Dialectics played a supporting role in Roman philosophy. The Stoa did apply it, but mainly as a method in formal logic.
Later influence of dialectics on thinking about toleration
The core of the dialectical argument is this. To get closer to the truth you need different angles. When they collide, it can lead to something beautiful, something better. But then you need different perspectives. If you were to ban certain controversial angles, you would limit the possibilities to get closer to the truth.
Typical dialectical arguments are:
Two know more than one.
A discussion of two opposing views leads to a refinement and greater understanding of both views.
Opposing views can both be true.
Through thorough reasoning, you can fuse contradictions into a new overarching concept or solution. Hegel and Marx set the tone here.
So there are two ways to promote dialectics. Firstly as a method. The writer juxtaposes two ideas, resulting in a nuanced, better reasoned or paradoxical view.
Dialectics as a method became widespread, and has been further developed by, among others Aristotle, Kant and Hegel.
Dialectics as an ideal of the Enlightenment
But you can also see dialectics as a social ideal. It is then not the thinker who lets two ideas enter into a dialogue. The thinker believes that there should be room for opposing ideas in the social debate. People with opposing views then enter into dialogue or debate, resulting in more mutual insight or a deeper understanding.
The goal of the true will, the good, the right, where I am free, universal, and the others are also free, where also I am equal to me, that is, the relation of free to free, and with it true essential laws, provisions of the general will, and justice prevails - we find this freedom only in the Greek people. So this is where the philosophy begins.
- Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Lectures on the history of philosophy (from 1805)
After the Greek civilisation, the dialectical method watered down a bit. It was still somewhat dormant in the Middle Ages, following in the footsteps of Aristotle.
Also in the discussion about religious toleration after the Reformation, one hardly comes across dialectical arguments. The discussion was mainly about who is right. Reformers were not very interested in contradiction and would be ready to call the opponent a heretic. Philosophers who focused on the question of religious toleration were mainly applying arguments of humanitas, scepticism and relativism. A notable exception was Spinoza, who approached debates such as between faith and reason dialectically.
Dialectics mainly came to play a role in the discussion about freedom of conscience, from about a century later. In the series of newsletters on freedom of conscience, we will consider the dialectical arguments of Milton, Holbach and Mill.
Further reading
If you want to read more about the subject of dialectics and free speech in Antiquity, I recommend this article as an introduction:
Henry Berti, Ancient Greek dialectic as expression of freedom of thought and speech, Journal of the history of ideas (1978)
Should you want to read (a lot) more about it, I recommend this book:
Ineke Sluiter, Ralph M. Rosen (ed.), Free speech in classical antiquity (2004)
More recommended articles can be found as a hyperlink in the text.
This was the second episode in the series about the ancient sources of toleration.
The first episode was about:
Why we really can't know anything for sure
Classical sources of toleration, part one: epistemology and skepticism. About the doubts of Xenofanes, Plato, Sokrates, Pyrrho, Sextus Empiricus, Cicero. And their rediscovery in the Renaissance.
The next episodes will be about:
Are our moral beliefs just illusions
Moral skepticism between classical Greece and the Enlightenment
Don't let it get to you
How our thinking about toleration is influenced by classical stoicism
Humanitas and forgiveness
Clemency and humanity as a source of toleration. About the biological tendency to forgiveness, the humanity of Cicero, the source of Jesus' forgiveness, and about repentance and retribution.
We don't owe our ideals of liberty and equality to Antiquity
Freedom and equality are quintessential in toleration. And the Greeks and Romans knew them too. But we hardly owe them this source of toleration.
On pragmatic rulers and subjugated nations
Pre-modern despots could be quite tolerant towards conquered peoples. About idols taken hostage, Roman exceptionalism, and the tolerance of Genghis Khan.
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